Iranian Ships Blocked by Egypt
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We are living in strange days. On February 17, 2011, Egypt didn’t allow two Iranian ships to cross the Suez Canal in their way to Syria. Since every ship crossing the canal must get the approval from Egypt's foreign and defense ministries, this is a good test for Egypt’s true allegiances. It is blocking Iran, while helping a different aggressor.
In Israeli Subs: On Dolphins and German Crimes I reported how in 2009 an Israeli submarine crossed the Suez Canal in its way to the Red Sea. In June 2002, former State Department and Pentagon officials confirmed that the U.S. Navy observed Israeli missile tests in the Indian Ocean in 2000, and that the Dolphin-class vessels have been fitted with nuclear-capable, submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), capable of reaching targets 1,500 kilometers away. ("Gabriel," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, August 28, 2003). These are offensive moves – unlike Iran’s defensive ones. Norway agrees with me. In the last week of September 2010, Norway announced that Dolphin submarines built by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) in Kiel, Germany, for Israel, would not be allowed to be tested on Norwegian waters. HDW leases from the Norwegian government the Marvika Submarine Base on Norway's southern shore as a tasting base; oddly, this port served the German submarines during WWII. As of now, no new site for deepwater tests has been chosen by the shipbuilder. Yet, Egypt allowed the crossing of the Israeli weapon of mass destruction.
Except for disclosing itself as a Zionist stronghold even after Mubarak’s step-down, Egypt achieved very little. It is difficult to get accurate data on military ships, but I did check out the times of commercial vessels – often bigger, heavier and slower than commercial ships – and found that in round trips the Suez Canal offers only a marginal advantage over a trip around the Horn of Africa in some cases just ten days for the round trip. In strategic terms, it means very little. The Egyptian temporary administration proved itself childish and ineffective.
Probably, Netanyahu contacted Omar Suleiman in panic, asking for the blocking of the Iranian ships. Israel sees that as the possible opening of a new front, and this is a major concern. The Israeli marine front is relatively calm, since Syria and Lebanon have small navies and Egypt is still an ally (until when?). If Iran manages to place ships in the Mediterranean, the strategic situation changes dramatically. In a sense this would be the parallel to the IDF’s vertical bypass unit described in The Cross of Bethlehem. Israel plans to open new fronts deep within Syria and Egypt in the case of a massive attack, forcing those armies to split in order to take care of a new front. A new front on the Mediterranean would have a similar effect on the IDF, without the need to shoot even one bullet. The very presence of an Iranian fleet would force the IDF to spend so many forces in the monitoring and blocking of imaginary moves that probably the American taxpayer would be force to double its annual contribution to the Zionist state. And even Netanyahu knows that wouldn’t happen.
Two days after the publication of this article, on February 19, 2011, Egypt announced it would let the two Iranian ships pass. Media matters; Internet is now the mainstream media.
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