This report was published after criminal charges were laid on May 24, by Turkey against several IDF officers, demanding life sentences for their actions during the flotilla events. Among them was former IDF Chief of Staff, General Gaby Ashkenazi (see Criminal Charges Placed against IDF General Ashkenazi), who also plays an important role in the State Comptroller's report. General Ashkenazy behaved like a brute during the event, but before it, he issued a severe warning to Netanyahu. He was so confident that he would be ignored, that he sent the warning in an official letter to Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Ehud Barak. The document was posted weeks before the sailing date; the general claimed in it that the flotilla should be thwarted by diplomatic means before resorting to the use of force. A characteristic of military mail is that it gets over-registered; neither Netanyahu nor Barak could claim not to having received it. Netanyahu didn’t even try to deny that, the comptroller found that Netanyahu had held four work meetings with Ashkenazi on the issue. Yet, Netanyahu said to the comptroller “the Chief of Staff didn’t raise the issue of the threat that flotilla members posed nor did he voice any concern that violence would erupt. In the meeting at the Defense Minister’s office, the possibility that the flotilla was dangerous because of its size or the probability that shots would be fired was assessed as negligible.” Netanyahu strengthened this apparent contradiction by adding “in no place, in no discussion, not with anyone, not with the Defense Minister, not with the Chief of Staff, not with the Navy Commander… nowhere was a problem with the operation raised.” These contradictions are typical of Netanyahu; in the Bibi Tours Affair he recognized the facts but claimed everything was legal (including double-billing!).

Israel State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss

Yet, the issue of the IDF's early warnings seems secondary when compared to the decision making process used by Netanyahu. Aswas the case after the 1973, 1982, and 2006 wars, the process was found tremendously flawed. Every time, the same errors were repeated by the political system, and the same criticism was made afterwards by the judiciary system; the Israeli Administration has successfully proved that it has the learning power of an amoeba. The comptroller’s report shows that Benjamin Netanyahu runs the Israeli government as if it were a tiny neighborhood shop, ignoring all legal procedures. The comptroller reports of awareness at all levels that the event was about to turn violent, as opposed to previous flotillas, which were thwarted peacefully. Five days before the flotilla’s arrival at Gaza, in the only relevant meeting held by the seven senior ministers, General Ashkenazi warned that a military takeover of the ship Mavi Marmara would lead to a violent confrontation. “I want to clarify that it isn't easy, but we will do it. It is no-two minute operation,” he said and added “If anyone wants to make a drama out of it – there's enough fuel for two or three days – not an hour… I have no doubt that there will be violence there. Let it be made clear. The people will confront us. I think it’s an illusion to think that if 20 people descend onto a ship with 400 people aboard they will be met with applause. They will fight them.” Three of the ministers—including Intelligence and Atomic Energy Minister Dan Meridor and Benny Begin—raised concerns over the IDF’s plans, inquired about the details but were silenced by Netanyahu. The comptroller claims “the meeting’s participants were unaware of the purpose of the debate and its content, and, on any account, did not have enough time to prepare for it;" thus the decision-making process was centralized by Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Ehud Barak. The comptroller emphasized that the ministers received only a general overview of the flotilla, without any complete discussion as to the operation’s consequences, and didn’t hear of any alternative paths.